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Hatheway: Guilty as Charged

GUILTY AS CHARGEDt
Jay Hatheway*
Article 125, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal
copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex or with an
animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to
complete the offense.
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a courtmartial may direct.
The following essay relates the first constitutional challenge to the
statutory prohibition of homosexuality in the Armed Forces. Specifically, this is the story of my 1975 court martial during which time I was
represented by the Lawyers Military Defense Committee and the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"). Our goal was to overturn Article
125, the sodomy statute of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Despite the failure of the ACLU to persuade the United States Supreme
Court to reject the sodomy statute, precedent setting arguments were
created which influenced subsequent attempts to refute the ban on homosexuals and homosexual behavior.
The time period during which the trial and appeals took place witnessed the confluence of several factors that laid the foundation for this
legal assault, and provided a timely opportunity for an end to the discrimination against gays and lesbians in uniform. The anti-war, femit This is excerpted from GUILTY AS CHARGED, THE TRUE STORY OF A GAY BERET (GBL
Publishers 2001) and is reprinted with the permission of the author.
* Associate Professor and Chair, Department of History, Edgewood College, Madison,
Wisconsin. B.A., 1967, Claremont McKenna College; M.A., 1979, The Monterey Institute of International Studies; Ph.D., 1992, University of Wisconsin, Madison. Professor Hatheway is the author
of numerous articles and books, the most recent of which is entitled THE GILDED AGE
CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN AMERICAN HoMOPHOBIA, 2003 by Macmillan Press.
The Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal is pleased to publish this essay in this
Symposium issue. This Symposium issue was inspired by Hofstra University's Don't Ask, Don't
Tell: 10 Years Later Conference held on September 18-20, 2003 at Hofstra University.
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nist, and civil rights movements of the late sixties and early seventies seriously challenged the status quo, and gave rise to a new political culture
of personal empowerment among the politically marginalized. Inspired
by the success of these movements, homosexual Americans began to
organize in the aftermath of the June 28, 1969 police raid on the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village, New York, and in the process gave birth
to the gay rights movement.' Subsequent to the organizing efforts of
thousands of gays and lesbians, the American Civil Liberties Union
threw its considerable weight behind efforts to repeal sodomy statues nationwide.
Some of the new organizations, such as the Gay Liberation Front,
were considered radical, and were inspired by a Marxist philosophy that
condemned all oppression as a consequence of capitalism. Not only
homosexuals, but also people of color, women, and workers were to be
gathered up in a vast movement of national liberation. Other organizations, such as the Gay Activists Alliance, were less ideological, and were
single-mindedly concerned with the plight of the American homosexual.
Common to both, however, was a realization that gays and lesbians constituted an oppressed minority whose civil rights had been abrogated by
virtue of their status as homosexuals. The mission of the new gay
movement was to secure those civil rights in a manner consistent with
the claims of women and African Americans. The claims of American
homosexuals were thus to be folded into the much larger national civil
rights movement, even as this larger movement initially rejected those
claims. Nevertheless, the gay rights movement was able to galvanize
thousands, and as the 1970s progressed, gays became more politically
visible. Together with anti-war protesters, civil rights activists, and
feminists, gays and lesbians agitated and made their views clear. 2
The armed forces were not immune from these developments, and
by 1975, the Army was in turmoil. African American, female, and homosexual soldiers were recalcitrant, and began to argue for equal treatment consistent with the demands of their civilian counterparts. Furthermore, the collapse of the American war effort in Vietnam saw a
general disintegration of morale and discipline that threatened the very
essence of military preparedness as then understood. Thousands of GIs
1. See generally DONN TEAL, THE GAY MILITANTS: How GAY LIBERATION BEGAN IN
AMERICA, 1969-1971 (St. Martin's Press 1971).
2. See generally JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING
OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1983).
DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A GAY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (Simon & Schuster 1999).
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espoused anti-war positions, and publicly questioned America's role in
the world. In an effort to reestablish its authority, the military became
obdurate. While some concessions were made on the basis of race and
gender with respect to rank and occupational specialty, anti war protesters were quickly discharged, and gay soldiers were subjected to official
opprobrium and horrendous misconduct by those in command.
From the command's point of view, homosexuality was an insidious perversion, which destroyed unit cohesion and undermined military
discipline. This attitude mirrored that of society at large, and the military
felt it had an obligation to treat homosexuals accordingly. Homosexuality would not be officially tolerated under any conditions, and soldiers
considered perverted were punished, usually by humiliation, physical assault, and an automatic dishonorable discharge. Unlike skin color or
gender, the military believed homosexuality was a very sick choice
made by a very disturbed mind. Mental illness was not conducive to unit
cohesiveness, and had to be eliminated. Because the issue dealt with the
sensitive subject of sexual desire, it was all the more serious.
It is within this context that lesbian and gay soldiers reached out to
the civilian gay rights movement for help, and the issue of gays in the
military was born. In March, 1975, Air Force Tech Sergeant Len Matlovich informed the Secretary of the Air Force that he was gay, and five
months later after I had been accused of homosexual sodomy, the two of
us joined forces under the direction of American Civil Liberties Union
and developed a dual legal challenge to the prohibition on homosexuality which if successful, would have allowed lesbians and gays the right
to serve, and do so with their sexuality intact. Whereas Len was the first
to challenge the regulations, which banned homosexual soldiers from active duty, I was the first to attempt to have the federal statue, which proscribed homosexual sexual behavior overturned. 3 As the first constitutional challenge to the military's sodomy statute, my court martial thus
provides an insight into the original arguments, which were employed by
the ACLU while simultaneously shedding light upon the Army's counter
positions.
The ACLU relied upon two essential arguments in support of their
assumption that the sodomy statue was unconstitutional as applied to
gays and lesbians. First, selective prosecution of only homosexual sodomy under Article 125 was impermissible, and second, prohibitions
against homosexual sodomy violate the Establishment Clause of the
3. See generally RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: GAYS & LESBIANS IN THE U.S.
MILITARY, (St. Martin's Press 1993).
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First Amendment. The Secretary of the Army argued one primary position, namely that the military was a special community with the right to
regulate the behavior of its members.
According to the ACLU,
Hatheway's allegations at court-martial in support of his motion to
dismiss his criminal charge raised two impermissible classifications
upon which the decision to court-martial him was based. The first was
the homosexual, as opposed to the heterosexual, nature of the act. The
second was his gender. The Court of Appeals held that selective
prosecution of homosexual acts under Article 125 ... bore a substantial relationship to the military's important interests in prohibiting acts
of homosexual sodomy.
This holding is [erroneous]. First, prosecutorial discrimination by
military officials is in direct conflict with the military's express needs
for strict order and discipline. Such selective use of the criminal law,
which systematically allows certain forms of proscribed conduct to go
unpunished, does not further the concept of order .... To the contrary,
it enhances in the minds of service members the idea that the rule of
law is what a particular convening authority at a given time chooses it
to be.
Second, where prosecutorial discrimination occurs in the enforcement
of the [UCMJ], the practice strikes at the heart of civilian control of the
military.... The... convening authority, who selectively enforces
Article 125 against only homosexual sodomy, in effect thwarts the will
of Congress by punishing only homosexual acts while intentionally allowing heterosexual acts of sodomy to go unpunished.
Third, the very nature of the military weighs in favor of heightened judicial scrutiny in the area of selective enforcement of the criminal law
by military officials. In the civilian community, prosecutorial abuses
are checked to some extent by the democratic process. Service members, however, do not possess the right to vote their convening authority out of office. Thus, judicial scrutiny is the only effective means of
insuring that enforcement of the criminal law by military officials does
not become an arbitrary sword in the hands4 of a court-martial convening authority for use against certain troops.

4. Petitioner's Brief at 12-16, Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 454 U.S. 864 (1981) (No.
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A second argument dealt with the Establishment Clause,
As demonstrated by one of the witnesses at Hatheway's court-martial,
prohibitions against sodomy have a demonstrable Judeo-Christian history and purpose. The Court of Appeals found that sodomy laws, such
as Article 125, have not undergone substantial revisions since their inception and that they have not been advocated by secular groups.
Nevertheless, the Court found that the Army's interest in 'preventing
disruptive conduct' provides a secular purpose and effect for the enforcement of the sodomy prohibitions of Article 125.
As this [Supreme] Court stated in 'Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,' to be valid under the Establishment
Clause, a law must pass a three-prong test: (1) it must reflect a clearly
secular purpose; (2) its primary effect must be to neither advance nor
inhibit religion; and (3) it must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.
Article 125 prohibits sodomitic acts per se. It is important to notice
that the broad prohibitions of Article 125 require only proof of the
sexual act itself and not proof that the act under the circumstances did
injury to the secular interest of the military. Thus, enforcement of the
criminal prohibitions of Article 125 without requiring proof of injury
to the legitimate interest of the military entangles the government with
the advancement of religious orthodoxy because it involves it in criminal prosecution regardless of whether the acts in question did injury to
a governmental interest. [Therefore] the court-martial of homosexual
acts under Article 125 in which no proof that the sexual acts did injury
to the interest of the military is required, is an unnecessary entangleconcept of sin, and
ment with the furtherance of the Judeo-Christian
5
therefore violative of the Establishment Clause.
The Secretary of the Army had the support of the United States
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, which argued in favor of homosexual
prohibitions due to their disruptive nature,
The government has a compelling interest in maintaining a strong military force. Underlying our holding in Beller[v. Middendorf] was the
judgment that those who engage in homosexual acts severely compro-

81-159).
5.

Id. at 21-25.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

5

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 5
HofstraLabor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 21:2

mise the government's ability to maintain such a force. That judgment
was the basis for our holding that the Navy's policy of discharging all
such persons was constitutionally permissible.
The convening authority may select those cases for referral to a courtmartial, which involve violations of the UCMJ, which are most likely
to undermine discipline and order in the military. In light of Belier, we
hold that selection of cases involving homosexual acts for Article 125
prosecutions bears
a substantial relationship to an important govern6
mental interest.
Yet more was at stake than legal principles. On a personal level,
this is the story of how I was treated by members of my unit and by the
Judge Advocate General. I was humiliated before my peers, physically
and psychologically abused, isolated, and driven at one time to consider
suicide as the only way out. While we could not prove official misconduct, the Army initiated a campaign of deception from the moment the
incident was reported that culminated in false accusations against which
I was defenseless. Because the Army suspected I was gay, they used
that insight one week before I was to have been separated, and brought
sodomy charges against me for behavior, which they believed I, as a gay
person, must have engaged in. Why else, the argued, would I have been
alone with a GI with my pants down? Thus to a very real extent, the
trial was as much about being gay as acting gay, and how the armed
forces conflated the two in their accusation of homosexual sodomy.
I suppose that I should not have been surprised. I was, after all, a
commissioned Green Beret intelligence officer in charge of a myriad of
secrets so sensitive that only a handful of soldiers in Europe had access
to them. Any hint of scandal was sufficient to drive the command into
fits of rage, which indeed, is precisely what occurred. It has been almost
thirty years since my trial, but the sting of the Army's vituperation is
still felt.
As far as I know, I have always been gay, and so it was in spite of
this awareness that I accepted an Army ROTC four-year scholarship to
Claremont McKenna College in 1967. Unconcerned about the consequences to me if my sexual orientation were discovered, I accepted my
commission in the spring of 1971, and with little fanfare, I eventually
made my way through jump school, the Defense Language Institute,
Monterey, California, and Special Forces training at Ft. Bragg, North

6.

Hatheway vs. Secretary ofArmy, 641 F.2d 1376, 1382 (1981).
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Carolina. In November 1972, I arrived at Flint Kaseme, Bad Tolz, the
Federal Republic, home to the 1 0 th Special Forces Group (Airborne),
Europe. I was immediately assigned to an A-team as executive officer,
and for the next several months did what was expected of me as a team
member. The following year, I was fortuitously assigned to the Army's
language school in Oberammergau where I was immersed in German,
and where, to my great delight, I became involved in my first gay relationship with a local man who graciously taught me how to speak, drink,
and eat like a true Bavarian. After some several months of what I can
only describe as bliss, I returned to my unit, and was assigned the relatively important position of battalion S2, Intelligence.
Unlike the A-Teams, which were constantly out in the field, the S2
was literally welded to the headquarters battalion, permanently stationed
in the Kaserne proper. As such, I had very little opportunity to travel,
and thus found myself interacting with headquarters staff, who, it turned
out were incredibly nosy. For my part, I began quietly dating first one,
then another, ignorant of the fact that I was being watched by any number of silent eyes as I went about my illicit business. By 1974, the post
commander had been apprised that I was not quite like all the other men,
and indeed, was in all probably a "queer, " as was later explained to me
when I was told I was under investigation. Shaken, but determined to
keep my secret a secret, I simply lay low for the duration of the investigation, which as it turned out, found the allegations to be without merit.
With lukewarm apologies and a stern warning that faggots would not be
tolerated, I returned to my job even as most people let me know that I
really was queer after all. Undaunted, I went about my business, and
once again secretly began to date. Eventually, I was able to establish a
fairly stable relationship that continued until my partner left the service
and returned to the States.
By 1975, I was getting anxious to leave, and filed early separation
papers. My initial tour of duty was supposed to have been for five years,
but it was increasing apparent that most of my fellow soldiers just assumed I was gay if only because I didn't date and was known to be in
the company of but one soldier, himself frequently the butt of crude homophobic jokes. By late spring, my early separation had been approved,
and I quietly prepared to make my exit, set for early August. Time
passed quickly and uneventfully, such that by early August I had completely cleared post and was waiting for my departure on the 11. On the
,
7 th I found myself in line at our mailroom for my final pickup, when a
soldier behind me struck up a conversation about my being a "shorttimer." After a few pleasantries, he invited me up to his room for a go-
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ing-way drink, which I quickly accepted. Later that afternoon we found
ourselves enjoying each dther's companyas well as his scotch, when literally out of the blue he began to make sexual overtures. I was both
humored and horrified, but in any event, I refused his advances, upon
which he clumsily pulled my pants down against my objections. Just
then, his roommate entered the room, blanched, and left as fast as he had
come in. From that moment, my life became a nightmare.
After adjusting myself, I too, left and returned to my apartment,
hoping that all of this would just go away. Although anxious, I went
about finalizing my departure, and then on the 10th, I received a phone
call form the commander's office in which the adjutant informed me that
the Colonel wanted to see me ASAP. I jumped into my last pair of fatigues, walked over to the post headquarters, and after some twenty
minutes, entered the commander's office, only to find him surrounded
by his senior officers. With virtually no warning, the commander then
proceeded to read me my rights, and then forthwith accused me of having committed homosexual sodomy, a violation of Article 125, with another soldier. I was stunned. As I was to discover later, the roommate
who had so suddenly entered the room assumed that I had been engaged
in sex acts, and had consequently told the command.
For the next six months, my life was a living hell. Unwilling to defend me because of the nature of the charges, the Judge Advocate General's office got me in contact with a American civilian attorney out of
Stuttgart who represented the ACLU. Thus began our long legal ordeal
that rocked my post and contributed to my humiliation by members of
not only my unit, but from JAG as well. Because the post was small,
rumors spread fast, and the rumor that the delay in my departure was due
to a sodomy investigation was too rich to disregard. Soon the entire
command knew what was up, and I gradually became the recipient of
crude remarks and verbal abuse, culminating with a physical attack by
one officer in my own apartment. In order to avoid this sort of thing, I
spent as much time as I could with my attorney in Stuttgart. Yet in spite
of this strategy, the military was relentless in its attempts of wear me
down. I was physically shadowed wherever I went and our phones were
tapped. When the person who had made advances against me in his
room was shown to be lying to save his skin, the military granted him
immunity from prosecution, and order him to tell the "truth." And when
it looked as though that tactic would fail, the military actually found an
ex-GI in the States who agreed to testify that I was a member of a homosexual drug ring, and that I was involved in the illicit sales of heroin.
Not content to stop here, I was also ordered to undergo neuro-
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psychological testing during which time more that 50 small pins were
inserted under my skin ina ring around my *head, resulting in much
bleeding down my face and neck. Not surprisingly, the test only proved
that I was sane, and psychologically fit, a finding that was not welcome
by the authorities. In a move reminiscent of the government's actions
against Daniel Elsberg, the office in which my psychological report was
stored was broken into, the report lifted, and re-written by an anonymous
agent who then returned it to its proper location. When apprised of this,
the military judge, while astonished, did nothing.
The trial itself began in November 1975. The first order of business was the voir dire, and it did not go well for us. The judge was slow
to allow my attorney to ask specific questions of each of the jurors. He
was, he stated, afraid that we might not be able to impanel a jury if we
kept up with our line of questioning, which focused around the issues of
discrimination against homosexuals and predispositions in sentencing.
We were able to discover, however, that the jurors frequently referred to
gays as queers or homos, and that there was a tendency to know what
type of a sentence I would receive even before the trial had begun. Although the former was of no concern, the latter resulted in a juror being
replaced, even as the rationale was explained before the entire jury. After that, no juror indicated he was inflexible as to sentencing.
The trial essentially revolved around whether or not the person I
had been drinking with had lied, but in spite of our ability to demonstrate
over and over again the scope and nature of his continued lying, the
prosecution always referred to the immunity. In short, one cannot lie if
one is ordered to tell the truth. We clearly made the case that the government's main witness not only lied in the courtroom, but indeed had
been investigated in previous instances for drug use in which he had
knowingly lied and had been reduced in rank. Our strategy was all to no
avail.
Eventually I was asked to testify on my own behalf. We had discussed the merits of this several times, and because of the peculiar position I found myself in, we agreed it would be a good thing. My situation
was peculiar because I had inadvertently submitted to the government a
written statement of my involvement that was a quasi admittance of
guilt. This was not a smart move on my part, but when I was first indicted, I was frightened beyond reason, and asked if there might be
something I might do, to which the adjutant replied firmly that a statement attesting to what had occurred would be very useful. How useful
to the prosecution did not cross my mind, thus in a near frenzy of panic,
I wrote a sworn statement that said I could not remember all the details,
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fearful that if I were to go into to much detail, I would be accused of being a homosexual! NIeedless to say', since I stated that I could not remember all the details, this was used again me in court since I could not
know in detail what had occurred without opening myself to perjury.
And since the man who entered the room could, by his own testimony
corroborate the fact that my pants were down, the jury had its required
"three person attestation" that indeed sodomy had taken place, this in
spite of the fact that everyone admitted that no sex acts were actually
seen, and that I and my alleged sex partner were at opposite ends of the
room. That sex be observed was obviously not a major concern; that
there might have been sex was, and a mere hint of sexual impropriety
was more than sufficient to allow the jury to vote unanimously, "guilty
as charged." At the sentencing phase, the military argued in favor of
hard labor, but fortunately wiser heads prevailed, and I was sentenced to
dismissal under condition less than honorable for the good of the service. Ironically, I was elated in so far as the ordeal was nov concluded
and I could get on with the rest of my life, which after 10 years of what I
now recognize to have been a severe stress syndrome, I did.,
For their part, the ACLU, represented by my civilian attorney who
in fact worked for an affiliate organization, the Lawyers' Military Defense Committee anticipated how the Army would react. Thus at the
very inception of these proceedings, it was explained to me that on the
merits of the case, we were probably going to lose, but that we might be
able to mount an effective constitutional challenge to Article 125, as
previously outlined in the introduction. This of course, we did, even
though the judge was not disposed to tackle constitutional issues "inmy
court." Indeed, our strategy allowed us to link up with Len Matlovich
who was challenging the army regs out of Washington, DC. Since we
were also in contact with the DC branch of the ACLU, it was decided
that we would move forward with a dual attack: Len would challenge the
regulations that forbad gays to serve, and I would challenge the UCMJ
statutory prohibition against same sex sexual relations. Unfortunately
both are more or less intact today, although there is some vague talk of
revising the sodomy statute to be in conformity with the recent Supreme
court decision to overturn Hardwick v. Bowers.
The reasons for the court martial were not too difficult to discern.
For one thing, in the 1970s as the War in Vietnam came to an end, and
the draft was concluded, a professional volunteer army was on the horizon, and many in uniform felt that if gays were allowed to serve, then it
would be extremely difficult to obtain recruits, particularly if parents objected to their sons and daughters serving around "queers." Another rea-
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son relates to the very dual strategy we employed: if Len were successful, then gays could serve, and since so many commanders hated gays,
there was always the option of the Article 125, thus I was used as a example of what could happen if gays served absent any regs. The truth is,
even we believed that there was a slim chance the courts would overturn
125. Perhaps the most important reason, however, has to do with image.
This was the period of the Cod War, and the US had a vested interest in
projecting power world wide, not unlike today. In this instance, there
was a consensus that homosexuals in the services would project the
wrong image to our putative enemies, in that homosexuals were conceived of as weak, limp-wristed perverts, and to have them openly in the
service would project the image to the world that the US itself was weak
and perverted, certainly an image the US did not want. Such, by the
way, holds valid today in so far as the Arab Muslim, contrary to popular
myth, rejects homosexuality as ungodly, impure, and unmanly, and the
death penalty is frequently the consequence of coming out in the Middle
East, especially Saudi Arabia. Thus to succeed against Al Qaeda, we
must once again project the image of unbridled manliness and purity,
two qualities that many in the US defense establishment are unwilling to
concede to homosexuals.
As we revisit "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" ten years after its adoption,
may of the same reasons for excluding homosexuals hold sway. Unfortunately the rationale for banning gay men and women is predicated
upon false assumptions about both the nature and causes of homosexuality that still inform top military commanders. Furthermore, as we go
about the nasty business of our war on terrorism, policy planers demand
the same manly image we attempted to project and protect during the
Cold War; anything less would be interpreted as a sign of weakness.
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